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This is a theory of total factor productivity based on measured capital market im-
perfections and costs of creating and operating formal sector ﬁrms. We develop a ﬁrm
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enforcement and high costs of formality are characterized by low allocative eﬃciency and
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a theory of total factor productivity (TFP) based on measured insti-
tutional diﬀerences across countries. In particular, we consider institutional heterogeneity in
terms of entry costs to the formal sector, diﬀerences in the tax structure (not only tax rates but
also cost of tax compliance), and also in the eﬃciency of debt enforcing mechanisms (measured
as debt recovery rate and debt enforcing costs). The question we are after is: how much of
the international diﬀerences in total factor productivity can be explained by measured costs of
doing business?
We build a model of ﬁrm dynamics with endogenous entry and exit that incorporates capital
ﬁnancing and bankruptcy decisions. The model allows for the existence of a formal and an
informal sector. Entering and operating in the formal sector is costly, but allows ﬁrms to produce
at a larger scale, while providing the ﬁrms with access to credit markets with better commitment
(given by observed recovery rates and associated costs). The degree of debt enforcement varies
across countries and aﬀects the interest rate that ﬁrms face. Countries have access to the same
production possibilities but we impose country-speciﬁc institutions, which we base on those
measured by the World Bank as reported in its Doing Business database. We ﬁnd that, by
increasing capital misallocation, the frictions explain up to 60% of total factor productivity
diﬀerences between the US and developing economies.
As Figure 1 shows, informal activity is a feature that, around the world, seems to be cor-
related to productivity and output per worker. Agents involved in the informal sector make
explicit eﬀorts not to be detected, which makes measuring the informal sector extremely chal-
lenging. Of the various measures of informal activity, we focus on the fraction of the labor force
that participates in the underground economy.1
1Measured as the fraction of the labor force not covered by a pension scheme. We focus on the the share of
labor force not covered by pension schemes because it provides a better direct measure of informality for the
US, the country we use for our benchmark calibration. Schneider and Enste (2000) report various measures of
the informal sector across countries (highly correlated with our measure), and is the most comprehensive study
to our knowledge regarding informality in a cross country setting. They include indirect estimates of informal
output from energy consumption or money demand or from discrepancies between oﬃcial and actual employment
from household surveys.
2The fraction of the labor force that is engaged in production outside of the formal sector
ranges from around 10% in developed countries to almost 100% at the low end of the income
distribution. Even when measures of informal activity are extremely noisy, such a large sector of
the economy cannot be ignored if we want to better understand economic development around
the world. Pratap and Quintin (2008) describe the empirical literature on informal economic
activity and document that the size of the informal sector is strongly correlated with the level of
economic development, tax burden and rule of law. They also argue that the informal sector is
mainly composed by small-scale, self-ﬁnanced, unskilled intensive activities. Regarding market
segmentation, the evidence points towards segmentation in the ﬁnancial markets and not in the
labour markets.





































































Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity and Size of the informal sector.
Note: Output per eﬀective worker refers to output per unit of human capital as reported by Hall and Jones (1999). Total Factor
productivity refers to the value reported by Hall and Jones (1999) raised to the power (1 − α). The share of informal labor force
corresponds to the share of the labor force not covered by a pension scheme as reported by the World Development Indicators 2006
It should not be surprising to observe a large number of ﬁrms producing in the underground
economy in countries where the costs of entering and operating in the formal sector are extremely
3high and the beneﬁts (the ability to enforce contracts) are almost negligible. Under these
conditions, ﬁrms endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector and are subject to
restrictions as well. They do not pay taxes, but have limited access to credit markets. When
the ﬁrm cannot borrow, the size and growth of the ﬁrm are limited. That is, production ends up
taking place at an ineﬃcient scale and therefore output and productivity are below the optimal
levels. If the mechanism we describe is present across countries, the level of informal activity
is a response to the institutional frictions. Conditional on the level of development, countries
with larger informal sectors should have lower level of total factor productivity.2 The idea
that informal activity can be understood as an optimal response to the economic environment
originated in Rauch (1991) and Loayza (1996).
In this paper we trace our steps back to the ideas in De Soto (2000), where the process by
which a ﬁrm enters the formal sector in Peru is described. De Soto (2000) argues that costly
entry mechanisms in the formal sector prevent ﬁrms from producing at an eﬃcient level. He
measures the entry cost in time and resources and concludes that one of the reasons production
is undertaken in the informal sector has to be the high costs associated with becoming formal.
On the other hand, he argues that the beneﬁt of formality lies in the ability to use physical
capital’s “parallel life”as collateral with which to secure the interests of third parties in the
event of breaches of contract.
Building on this idea, the World Bank launched the Doing Business project. Under this
project, the costs associated with many dimensions of doing business are recorded across coun-
tries. They measure, among other things, costs to register a ﬁrm, to obtain construction permits,
to hire workers, to pay taxes, and to close the business. The interesting feature of this project
is that instead of collecting observed data for each aspect of doing business in a country (which
depends on endogenous aspects such as the size of a ﬁrm), they run an experiment in which
they try to operate the same standardized ﬁrm across countries. This way the diﬀerent costs
across countries can be directly compared.
2Regressing relative total factor productivity on a constant, GDP per capita relative to US and informal labor
force as a fraction of total labor force delivers exactly that. The parameter of informal labor force is equal to
-0.24, with a standard deviation of 0.13.
4Our approach to ﬁrm dynamics originated with Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), and is close to Cooley and Quadrini (2001) who studied the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
constraints in a similar set up. Recent related literature on the distributional consequences
of frictions in this context include Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
and Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2008). In all cases, they back up the implied frictions in the
ﬁrm’s environment necessary to generate the observed distribution of ﬁrms. In this paper, as in
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) and Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008), the frictions that the
ﬁrms face are those observed in the data collected by the World Bank. This paper introduces
imperfect capital markets, and along that dimension the most closely related papers include
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007), Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2008), Erosa and Hidalgo
Cabrillana (2008), and Quintin (2008). Castro et al. (2008) and Erosa and Hidalgo Cabrillana
(2008) study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial contracts in environments with asymmetric information.
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) and Quintin (2008) study endogenous informal sectors that
result from imperfect contract enforcement. This paper builds on this literature by analyzing a
model of ﬁrm dynamics with idiosyncratic uncertainty and endogenous technology adoption. We
also consider diﬀerent ﬁnancial contracts where default costs are constrained by limited liability.
The relevant empirical literature regarding ﬁrm dynamics across countries include Tybout
(2000), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), and Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2007).
Tybout (2000) is the only one that reports data on ﬁrm characteristics in the informal sector,
while the other two use diﬀerent data sources but are focused on ﬁrms operating in the formal
sector.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the institutional diﬀerences across
countries as measured by the World Bank. We consider diﬀerences in the costs of entry to the
formal sector, tax codes, and eﬃciency of the contract enforcement mechanisms. In Section
3 we present the theoretical model, based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), with physical
capital and credit markets. Section 4 describes the stationary equilibrium of the model. Section
5 is devoted to the calibration of the model to the US data. In Section 6, we experiment with
diﬀerent measured institutions and compute their impact in terms of total factor productivity
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Figure 2: Cost to entry, income tax rate, cost of tax compliance, recovery rate, and cost of
default proceedings from the Doing Business Database. Outliers omitted.
and ﬁrm dynamics. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Diﬀerences across Countries
What ﬁrms have to do in order to enter, operate in, and exit from the formal sector varies across
countries. In order to compare these diﬀerent costs the World Bank, through its Doing Business
project, follows a standardized ﬁrm across countries and measures regulations to entry, opera-
tions, and exit. They measure the costs in terms of time and resources along many dimensions
aﬀecting the ﬁrm, such as starting a business, getting construction permits, employing workers,
obtaining credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts,
and closing a business. Of particular interest to us in this paper are the cost of entering the
formal sector, the tax rate and the level of tax compliance diﬃculty (while operating in the
formal sector), and the eﬃciency of the debt enforcing mechanisms if the ﬁrm decides to default
on its debt. These costs are depicted in Figure 2 against GNI per capita relative to the US.
6Entry Cost: The cost of entering the formal sector is constructed as in Moscoso Boedo and
Mukoyama (2008). It is the sum of two parts. It includes the costs of registering a business
and of dealing with licences to operate a physical locale.3 Both costs have a monetary cost
and a time cost (which is translated to monetary units by assuming that one worker has to be
employed full time in order for the ﬁrm to go through the entry process). The cost of entering
the formal sector as a fraction of the wage (denoted by wκ) varies greatly across countries, with
high levels of κ observed only at the low end of the income distribution. Registering a business
in the US costs 0.7% of GNI per capita, while in Sierra Leone it is over 1000% of GNI per capita.
In terms of time, in the US a business can be started immediately while in Yemen and Syria it
takes more than ﬁve years to start a formal business. Dealing with licenses also displays great
variation across countries. The cost is 13% of GNI per capita in the US and 600 times per capita
income in Liberia and 100 times in Zimbabwe. In terms of time, it takes 40 days to obtain a
license in the US and up to 1000 days in Haiti.
Tax Structure: The tax rate paid on proﬁts by the ﬁrms (τ) and payroll taxes (τw) do not
seem to exhibit a pattern over the distribution of income per capita, as shown by panels 1 and 3
in Figure 2. What does exhibit a similar pattern to the entry cost is the cost of tax compliance
(wcτ). This cost reﬂects the time that it takes to pay taxes in each country. We assume
that there is a full time worker during this time devoted to the tasks related to tax compliance,
and therefore translate time into costs as the worker’s annual wages. The cost of paying taxes
only displays levels above 10 weeks for countries below 20% of the US GNI per capita. Paying
taxes takes no time in the Maldives, 12 hours in the UAE, 187 hours in the US, and more than
1000 hours in Vietnam, Bolivia, Belarus, Cameroon, and Brazil. This indicates a great deal of
variation across countries in terms of the complexity of their tax code. Firms have to bear not
only the tax rate per se but also the cost of complying with the tax code, which at the low end
of the income distribution is not insigniﬁcant.
3The data used to generate the cost of dealing with licenses to operate a physical local is obtained from the
World Bank Doing Business database as “Dealing with Construction Permits”. Part of the elements involved
in construction permits, such as the cost of connection to basic services, are present when operating a physical
locale
7Bankruptcy eﬃciency: The eﬃciency of the system in the event of default has two com-
ponents, a cost component and a recovery rate. The cost of the system (φ), reported as a
percentage of the estate’s value, includes court fees and the cost of insolvency practitioners,
such as legal and accounting fees. It ranges from 1% of the estate’s value in countries like
Norway and Singapore to more than 40% in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Ukraine, and above
70% in the Central African Republic. The recovery rate refers to what external lenders obtain
once the ﬁrm decides to default on its debt (λ). It is eﬀectively zero for many extremely poor
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, only in developed countries it is above
75%. Note that this is the return obtained by the external creditor conditional on the borrower
defaulting. It measures the cents on the dollar recovered from that point on, and includes diﬀer-
ent channels to resolve the contract breach such as foreclosure, liquidation, and reorganization,
as reported by Djankov et al (2008).
3 Environment
We build a standard ﬁrm dynamics model based on Hopenhayn (1992) and incorporate capital
and credit markets as in Cooley and Quadrini (2001). Time is discrete, and we set one period
to be one year. There are three kinds of entities in the economy: ﬁrms, lenders and consumers.
Firms produce the consumption and capital goods used in the economy. They are the capital
owners and pay dividends to the consumers. Lenders make loans to the ﬁrms. Consumers
supply labor to the ﬁrms, and receive their proﬁt net of entry costs. We focus on the stationary
equilibrium.
3.1 Consumers









8where E[·] is the expectation operator, Ct is consumption and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
The household is endowed with one unit of labor which it provides to the ﬁrm at the market
wage rate w, and receives the proﬁts of the operating ﬁrms and a lump sum transfer from taxes
collected on these ﬁrms. The consumer is also responsible for the creation cost of new ﬁrms.
All of the saving and borrowing decisions are made by ﬁrms, so eﬀectively the household is not
allowed to borrow or save.
3.2 Technology
The unit of production is a single establishment ﬁrm, also understood as a unique investment
project. Each project is described by a production function f(z,k,n) that combines productivity
z capital k and labor n. We assume that the production function has decreasing returns to scale.
In particular, we let f(z,n,k) = zkαnγ with 0 < α + γ < 1 and α,γ ∈ (0,1).
There are two processes for z: one that allows for large scale operations (l), and one that
restricts production to a small scale (s). The productivity process open for large scale operations
is given by
ln(zt+1) = (1 − ρ)ln( l) + ρln(zt) + ǫt+1
with ǫt+1 ∼ N(0,(1 − ρ2)σ2
l ), where σ2
l is the variance,  l is the mean and ρ the autocorrela-
tion parameter of the process. We denote the conditional cumulative distribution of zt+1 by
ηl(zt+1,zt). The productivity process for small scale operations is assumed to be a constant
given by  s ≤  l.
We assume that projects whose productivity is drawn from the large scale process can only
be operated in the formal sector, whereas those from the small one can be operated in both the
formal and informal sector. This assumption captures the fact that the government is capable
of detecting only large scale production operations.
Having two productivity processes is one of the channels that allows the model to generate
capital missallocation together with small informal establishments as observed in the data by
9Bartelsman et. al. (2008) and Perry et. al. (2007).4









at the rate of the representative consumer’s β.5
Firms are created by the consumer paying a cost ce. Once launched, ﬁrms face a technol-
ogy adoption decision. They draw one investment opportunity from the initial productivity
distribution of the l process νl(z0). Draws from this distribution are assumed to be i.i.d across
ﬁrms. Firms then compare z0,l to  s and choose between staying out of the market or operat-
ing one of the projects as a formal or informal ﬁrm,, i.e the project choice is non-reversible.6
Unimplemented projects go back to the pool.
There is a random ﬁxed cost of production cf, measured in units of output, that is iid across
ﬁrms and over time with distribution ξ(cf). A ﬁrm that does not pay this ﬁxed cost is not
allowed to produce. Firms own their capital and can borrow from ﬁnancial intermediaries in the
form of non-contingent debt b ≥ 0. They ﬁnance investment with either debt or internal funds.
If the ﬁrm operates in the formal sector, it is subject to a proportional tax on proﬁts τ, a
cost in labor units of ﬁlling those taxes cτw, and a payroll tax τw. Creating a formal sector
ﬁrm requires an entry cost κw. In the calibration, taxes and the costs are set directly from the
corresponding measures in the Doing Business database.7
4Having only one productivity process that can be operated in both sectors generated some frictions for young
ﬁrms, but eventually the economy allocates more resources to the more productive ﬁrms and the impact in terms
of total factor productivity is negligible.
5In a stationary equilibrium, ﬁrm’s optimization is consistent with household’s optimization when the discount
factors coincide.
6This is consistent with the evidence presented in Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) who argue that manufacturing
plants needed to be completely redesigned in order to make good use of the new technologies.
7While government policies can be endogenous, in this paper we focus on measuring their eﬀects on aggregates
and policies are taken as exogenous. However, the equilibrium we ﬁnd is consistent with the solution to a model
that incorporates a one time political game with full commitment and the government optimally chooses the
taxes and costs reported by the World Bank.
103.3 Credit Markets
The credit industry makes loans to the formal and informal sector ﬁrms. Creditors are risk-
neutral and competitive. Each country behaves as a small open economy where intermediaries
can borrow or lend at the exogenous risk-free rate r. Asset markets are incomplete. In each
period, ﬁrms borrow using only one period non-contingent debt denoted by b. Since there
is perfect information, prices depend on ﬁrm’s characteristics given by their choice of sector
(formal or informal), their future level of capital (k′), their level of borrowing (b′), and their
current technology (zj where j = l,s). In particular, ﬁrms in the formal sector borrow at price
q
f
j (k′,b′,z) and ﬁrms in the informal sector borrow at price qi(k′,b′). In each period, ﬁrms can
default on their debt. A default triggers a bankruptcy procedure that liquidates the ﬁrm. When
making a loan to a formal sector ﬁrm, lenders take into account that in the case of default they
can recover up to a fraction λ of the original loan. The formal bankruptcy procedure has an
associated cost equal to a fraction φ of the ﬁrm capital. The values of the recovery rate λ and
the bankruptcy cost φ are obtained from the Doing Business database. Because the capital of
the informal ﬁrm is not legally registered, the recovery rate of a loan to an informal sector ﬁrm
that defaults is assumed to be zero. This assumption follows the evidence presented in Pratap
and Quintin (2008) where it is suggested that there is segmentation in the ﬁnancial markets
across formal and informal sectors.
Consistent with bankruptcy law across countries, we follow the limited liability doctrine.
This limits the owner’s liability to the ﬁrm’s capital.
4 Equilibrium
We focus on the stationary equilibrium of the model. In this equilibrium the wage rate and the
schedule of loan prices are constant. Every equilibrium function depends on the set of loan prices
and the wage rate. For ease of exposition we avoid making this dependence explicit. Before
deﬁning the equilibrium concept we study the problem of the agents in the economy. First, we
describe the problem of incumbent ﬁrms in the formal sector and informal sector, respectively.
11Then, we describe the entrants’ problem, the lender’s problem, and the representative consumer’s
problem.
4.1 Formal Sector Incumbent
An incumbent ﬁrm in the formal sector with operating a project j ∈ {l,s} (large scale and
small scale respectively), starts the period with capital k, debt b, and previous productivity z−1.
Then, the ﬁrm draws the ﬁxed cost that is required for continuing the operation, cf, and decides
to operate the project, exit after repayment of debts, or default and liquidate the ﬁrm. If the
ﬁrm decides to exit after repayment, it receives k − b. If it decides to default and liquidate the
ﬁrm, it receives the maximum of the remainder of the capital after paying the recovery rate
(net of the costs associated with default proceedings) to the outside investors and zero. The
value function of an ﬁrm at this stage is denoted as W
f
j (z−1,k,b,cf). If it decides to remain in
business, it pays cf and observes the current period’s productivity z. The value function of a
ﬁrm operating in the formal sector is denoted as V
f
j (z,k,b,cf). If the ﬁrm decides to operate, it
decides the amount of employment in the current period, n, capital and assets for the following
period, k′ and b′, and produces. Recall that in the formal sector it is then subject to income
taxes τ, the cost of preparing those taxes cτw, and the payroll tax τw.
The incumbent solves the Bellman equation
W
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γ − cf − w(1 + τw)(n + cτ)]
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− b ≥ 0
12The solution to this problem provides the exit decision rule χ
f
j(z−1,k,b,cf) that takes the value
of 0 if the ﬁrm continues to operate, 1 if the ﬁrm decides to default, and 2 if the ﬁrm decides to





j (z,k,b,cf), respectively, for a ﬁrm in the formal sector.
4.2 Informal Sector Incumbent
An incumbent ﬁrm in the informal sector, after observing the ﬁx operating cost cf, can choose
to stay informal, to pay the formal entry cost κw and switch operations to the formal sector,
or to exit the market after a default. More speciﬁcally, the informal incumbent ﬁrm solves the
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The value of switching to the formal sector is
e V
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− b ≥ 0
The solution to this problem provides the exit decision rule χi(k,b,cf) that takes the value
of 0 if the ﬁrm continues to operate in the informal sector, 1 if the ﬁrm decides to default, and
2 if it decides to switch its operations to the formal sector. We also obtain the optimal capital
and debt decision rules k′i(k,b,cf) and b′i(k,b,cf) for a ﬁrm operating in the informal sector,
and capital and debt decision rules e k′
j(z,k,b,cf) and e b′
j(z,k,b,cf) for a ﬁrm that switches from
the informal to the formal sector.
4.3 Entrants












Eﬀectively, an entrant has no capital, no debt, and the cost of production cf equals zero.
The entrant chooses between projects, conditional on the restriction that the large scale project
cannot be operated in the informal sector. The sector and project adoption decisions are made
after paying ce and observing the productivity level z0,l, which aﬀects the conditional distribution
from which the ﬁrst productivity parameter will be drawn. Diﬀerences in the volatility of the
process together with diﬀerences in initial productivity are going to generate diﬀerences in the
decisions by the entrants and by the potential lenders. That introduces diﬀerences in behavior
as a function of volatility and contract enforceability. In equilibrium, under free entry, We = 0
will hold.
The solution to this problem provides the entry decision rule Ξe(z0,l).
144.4 Lenders
Lenders make loans to formal and informal ﬁrms while taking prices as given. Proﬁt for a loan b′
to a ﬁrm in the formal sector with future capital k′, productivity z, and operating the a project











































,z) denotes the default probability of this borrower.




























) denotes the default probability of the informal borrower. In equilibrium, the










) = 0 for all (j,k′,b′,z).
4.5 Consumer’s Problem
Because we are looking for the stationary equilibrium, aggregates in the economy are constant.
This, and the fact that the consumer supplies its unit of labor inelastically, implies that the
consumer maximizes expected discounted utility subject to the following budget constraint:
C = w + Π + T − E + X,
where Π is the total proﬁt, T is the lump-sum transfer from the income and payrroll taxes, E
is the aggregate creation cost, and X is the exit value of ﬁrms. Note that the consumer is not
making any decision, only receiving transfers, proﬁts, and wages which are consumed period by
period.
154.6 Deﬁnition of equilibrium




j ,V i, e Vj}, decision
rules (capital, debt, default, exit and sector), a wage rate w, aggregate distributions of ﬁrms in
the formal ϑ(k,b,z,j;M) and informal b ϑ(k,b,M) sectors, and a mass of entrants M such that:
1. Given prices, the value function of the ﬁrms and the decision rules are consistent with
ﬁrms’ optimization.
2. The free entry condition is satisﬁed: We = 0.
3. Lenders make zero proﬁt for every type of loan.
4. Invariant distributions ϑ and b ϑ are stationary.
5. Aggregate consumption: C = w + Π + T − E + X.









In this section we calibrate the model to the US economy. The basis for this calibration can be
found in Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008) and D’Erasmo (2009).
The volatility of the large scale production process σl is set to 0.2305 and the autocorrelation
parameter ρ to 0.885 as estimated for the U.S. manufacturing sector by Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006).9 The process will be discretized to obtain the grid for z and the transition probabilities
ηl(z′|z) following the method explained in Tauchen (1986). The number of grid points for z
9These parameters were estimated from registered manufacturing ﬁrms. In the model, the formal sector
could include establishments operating both technologies, s and l. However, for the calibrated parameters, all
establishments in the formal sector operate technology l.
16is set to 17. From the transition matrix ηl(z′|z) we can derive the unconditional probabilities
η∗
l (z). We set the distribution of initial shocks νl(z0) = η∗
l (z).
The labor share γ is set to 0.64, a standard value, and the capital share is based on previous
estimates of the degree of decreasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm level. In particular, we set
α = 0.21, so α + γ = 0.85 as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). The risk free interest rate r is
set to 4% per year to match the average real return on a 5 year T-bill over the last 30 years.
We assume that β = 1
1+r. The depreciation rate δ is set to 7%. The value of the entry cost ce
is calibrated as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). In particular, we normalize the wage rate
to 1 and ﬁnd the value of ce that, in equilibrium, satisﬁes the free entry condition with equality.
We assume that the operating ﬁxed cost can take values of {0, b cf,+∞}.
The parameters {τ,cτ,τw,κ,λ,φ} are taking directly from the values reported in the Doing
Business data base for the U.S. economy (see Table 4 below). We set the tax rates τ = 0.23,
cτ = 0.09 and τw = 0.20; the entry cost κ = 0.26; and the bankruptcy parameters to λ = 0.77
and φ = 0.07.
We are left with ﬁve more parameters to calibrate: the mean of the productivity process of
the large scale and small scale projects  l and  s respectively, the operating cost b cf, and the
associated probabilities ξ(b cf) and ξ(∞). To obtain values for these parameters, we target the
size of the informal labor force, measured as those workers not covered by a pension scheme (as
reported by World Development Indicators 2006), the average size of formal establishments in
the U.S. and the exit rates distribution across the size of ﬁrms. The data regarding the size
distribution of establishments (in the formal sector) and exit rates in the US comes from the
Statistics of US Business (SUBS) data set for the years 2003-2004. It is the same data used in
Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008).10
Table 1 displays the calibrated parameters and a summary of the moments used.
10A description of this data set can be found in http : //www.census.gov/epcd/susb/introusb.htm. Statistics
of U.S. Businesses basic data items are extracted from the Business Register, a ﬁle of all known single and multi-
establishment employers maintained and updated by the U.S. Census Bureau. The annual Company Organization
Survey provides individual establishment data for multiestablishment companies. Data for single-establishment
companies are obtained from various Census Bureau programs, such as the Annual Survey of Manufactures and
Current Business Surveys, as well as from administrative records of the Internal Revenue Service, the Social
Security Administration, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
17Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Moment (US economy)
Discount Factor β 0.9615 Avg. yearly return 5-year T-Bill
Depreciation Rate δ 0.07 Manufacturing Sector
Labor Share γ 0.64 Labor Share
Capital Share α 0.21 Degree of Decreasing Returns
Std Dev σl 0.2305 Manufacturing Sector
Autocorrelation ρ 0.885 Manufacturing Sector
Creation Cost ce 0.11 Entry Condition
Mean process  l 1.62 Avg. Operating Establishment
Small Scale productivity  s 0.762 Size Informal Sector
Positive Operating Cost b cf 8.0 Exit Rate Distribution
Distribution Op. Costs {ξ(b cf),ξ(∞)} {.10,.042} Exit Rate Distribution
Table 2 shows moment values from the data, used for the calibration, and those produced
by the model.
Table 2: Target Moments
Moment US Data Model
Average Formal Est. 17.6 17.6
Informal Sector (fraction Labor Force) 7.8% 7.8%
Exit Rate Distribution









Note: the size of the informal labor force is measured as those workers not covered by a pension scheme (World Development
Indicators 2006). The data regarding the size distribution of establishments (in the formal sector) and exit rates in the US comes
from the Statistics of US Business (SUBS) data set for the years 2003-2004 (see Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama 2008).
After the calibration exercise is done, we test the model in diﬀerent dimensions. In particular,
we ask how the distribution of operating establishments in the formal sector over size and
age generated by the model compares with that of the US (obtained from Business Dynamics
18Statistics for the year 2004). Table 3 shows the joint distribution of age and size of operating
establishments as well as the unconditional distributions of establishment size and age (far right
column and bottom row respectively).
Table 3: Distribution of US Formal Establishments by Age and Employment Size
Age Young Middle Old Total Size Dist.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Employment Size (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1-4 13.6 0.04 20.6 9.0 14.4 19.6 48.6 28.9
5-9 2.5 1.3 9.8 10.1 9.5 9.8 21.8 25.1
10-19 1.2 7.2 6.2 10.5 6.8 5.3 14.2 20.1
20 - 49 0.7 5.0 3.9 11.1 5.0 2.9 9.6 18.4
50 - 99 0.2 1.2 1.2 3.9 1.8 0.5 3.2 5.1
100 - 249 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.8 1.0 0.1 1.8 2.1
250 + 0.0 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.2
Total Age Dist. 18.4 14.9 42.6 46.7 39.0 38.3 100 100
Note: Data corresponds to the distribution of establishments by ﬁrm size and age for the year 2004 from Business Dynamics Statistics. “Young”
corresponds to 0-1 years in operation,“Middle” corresponds to 2-10 years, and “Old” corresponds to 11 years or more.
The model does a good job generating the right distributions of operating establishments in
the formal sector for both size and age. Regarding size, it generates the right number of small
establishments (with less than 19 employees), but misses at the very low end of the distribution
(less than 5 employees). With respect to the age distribution of formal establishments, the
model is on target when compared to the fraction of young, middle and old establishments. A
deeper look at the joint distribution shows that the model under predicts the fraction of young
establishments in the smallest size category. The reason is that the productivity threshold to
enter the formal sector endogenously generates young establishments that are relatively more
productive and therefore bigger than observed in the data. On the other hand, the model yields
a distribution of middle and old establishments across sizes that closely resembles that of the
data.
By construction, the average entry rate and exit rate in the model are identical. Their value
equals 8%. The entry and exit rates in the data are 11.1% and 10.2% respectively. Thus,
compared to the US data, the model average entry and exit rates are three and two percentage
19points lower respectively. The distance between the model and data entrant size distribution,
entry and exit rates is partly due to the way the data is collected. In the data, establishments
are observed at one point in time. Those establishments that are less than one year old, are
considered entrants. However, the model counterpart for entrant establishments is deﬁned as
those establishments that are exactly one year old.
6 The Eﬀects of Country Speciﬁc Institutions
In this paper, we ask whether institutional diﬀerences, quantiﬁed by diﬀerences in the cost of
entry to the formal sector, the tax structure, and the eﬃciency of debt enforcing mechanisms can
help explain aggregate productivity diﬀerences across countries. Due to the high computational
burden of the exercise, we limit the number of observations and group countries by income level
following the World Bank’s deﬁnition. The World Bank distinguishes between High Income
Countries (HIC) and Developing Countries. In turn, Developing Countries are classiﬁed as
Upper Middle Income Countries (UMIC), Lower Middle Income Countries (LMIC) and Low
Income Countries (LIC).11
In order to implement this experiment, we use the Doing Business database for the year 2009
to obtain the median (λ,φ,τ,cτ,τw,κ) for each income group. Table 4 shows parameter values
for the US economy (used in the benchmark calibration) and those of High, Upper Middle,
Lower Middle and Low Income countries.
We then compare the benchmark case (calibrated to the US) with the equilibrium across
income groups. Our experiment can be described as follows. First, calibrate the model to the US
economy by using (λ,φ,τ,cτ,τw,κ)US. In this case, we normalize w = 1 to then iterate on the set










) until lenders make zero proﬁt on each contract and ﬁnd the
mass of potential entrants M that clears the labor market. Next, for each income group, we ad-
just the group speciﬁc parameters to (λ,φ,τ,cτ,τw,κ)g, where g ∈ {HIC,UMIC,LMIC,LIC}
11Roughly, countries are classiﬁed as HIC if their GNI per capita is higher than 25% of the US, UMIC if their
GNI per capita falls between 8% and 25% of the US, LMIC if their GNI per capita falls between 2% and 8% of
the US and LIC if their GNI per capita is below 2% of the US.
20Table 4: Frictions across income groups
λ φ τ cτ τw κ
US 0.77 0.07 0.23 0.09 0.20 0.26
High (HIC) 0.72 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.28 1.08
Upper Middle (UMIC) 0.30 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.37 1.33
Lower Middle (LMIC) 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.31 5.08
Low (LIC) 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.23 7.03
Note: Countries are classiﬁed following the World Bank’s income groups. Countries are HIC if their GNI per capita is higher than
25% of the US, UMIC if their GNI per capita falls between 8% and 25% of the US, LMIC if their GNI per capita falls between 2%
and 8% of the US and LIC if their GNI per capita is below 2% of the US. Median values for each group and friction are reported.






′) until lenders make
zero proﬁts and the labor market clears (given M obtained for the US). Finally, we adjust the
creation cost for each income group ce until the free entry condition is satisﬁed.
Table 5: Main Results
Developing Countries
HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
TFP 0.95 0.90 0.63 0.79 0.54 0.72 0.36 0.72
Informal labor force (%) 8.8 29.8 45 72.0 71.7 92.3 95 93.9
Output per eﬀ. worker 0.94 0.87 0.45 0.71 0.32 0.63 0.12 0.52
Note: TFP and Output per eﬀective worker are reported relative to the US value. Data is from Hall and Jones (1999). One unit of
eﬀective worker equals one unit of human capital. Model TFP is calculated as TFP ≡ Y
K e α where e α = 1/3 is also taken from Hall
and Jones (1999). The size of the informal labor force is taken from the World Development Indicators(2006) as the share of the
labor force not covered by a pension scheme.
Table 5 displays the main results for each income group and compares the model to the
data for the median country in each group. Values of total factor productivity and output per
eﬀective worker are taken from Hall and Jones (1999).12 The informal labor force is reported
by the 2006 World Development Indicators by the World Bank as the share of the labor force
not covered by a pension scheme.
The most important result of the paper is that the model accounts for up to 60% of TFP
diﬀerences between the US and Developing Countries. In particular, it accounts for 58%, 60%
and 44% of total factor productivity diﬀerences between the US and the median Upper Middle,
12One unit of eﬀective worker corresponds to one unit of human capital in Hall and Jones (1999).
21Lower Middle and Low Income Country respectively.13 We will extensively analyze the sources
of observed productivity diﬀerences and the role of each friction in what follows. In short,
we ﬁnd that allocative eﬃciency and the share of output produced by small scale ﬁrms in the
informal sector play a crucial role.
In terms of informal activity, the model generates sizable informal sectors that are negatively
correlated with GDP per worker, as observed in the data. The model delivers an informal labor
force that is on target across income levels, ranging from around 10% in the US to almost 94%
at the low end of the income distribution. However, the model overshoots the data in the middle
of the income distribution.14
The model output per eﬀective worker values are up to ﬁve times higher than what is seen
in the data, in the case of the Low Income Countries. This discrepancy comes from diﬀerences
of the same order of magnitude in terms of capital per eﬀective worker that result from the fact
that lenders in each country have access to the same risk free rate (see Table 6 below).
Table 6: Diﬀerences across Income Groups
Developing Countries
HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Avg Employment formal 11.1 29 129.8 41.5 175.0 108.6 386.4 132.3
ln(Var Employment formal) 10.5 7.91 12.7 8.55 12.7 10.48 13.6 9.94
Capital per eﬀ. worker 0.99 0.91 0.41 0.75 0.10 0.65 0.04 0.64
Domestic Credit to
Private Sector (% GDP) 54.9 81.4 21.3 30.7 16.0 6.6 7.5 3.7
Formal Entry Rate 0.81 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.55
Business Density 1.62 0.46 0.93 0.13 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.01
Note: Capital per eﬀective worker, Formal Entry Rate, Business Density and Domestic Credit to Private Sector are reported relative
to the US value. Data on average employment and variance of employment is taken from Alfaro et. al. (2007). Capital per eﬀective
worker is from Hall and Jones (1999). One unit of eﬀective worker equals one unit of human capital. Data on the Formal Entry Rate
and Business Density are taken from the 2008 World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey and Database. The model counterpart is
obtained as total formal labor force over the average size of formal establishments which equals the measure of formal establishment
to total population. Domestic Credit to GDP is also taken from the World Development Indicators (average 2004-2007). Domestic
credit to private sector in the model is computed as the ratio of formal debt to total output.
13These values are obtained by taking the ratio of the model diﬀerence in relative TFP to the data diﬀerence
in relative TFP. For example, for UMIC: 0.58 =
(1−0.79)
(1−0.63).
14The model can generate the right size of the informal sector by including tax enforcement. We experimented
with this extension and the broad nature of our results changes little but complicates the analysis.
22In Table 6, we present other important moments across income groups that are relevant
for two reasons. First, frictions aﬀecting the endogenous distribution of ﬁrms over capital and
debt will impact moments such as capital per worker, credit to GDP, and mean and variance of
employment. Second, since data is available across countries for these variables, they provide a
natural test of the performance of our model.
With regards to the distribution of establishments in the formal sector, the model is on target
both on average size and variance of size (measured by employees) as reported by Alfaro et. al.
(2007). Lower wages and higher productivity thresholds to enter the formal sector generate
larger and more dispersed ﬁrms in countries with large frictions.
Similar to what we observe in the data, the model generates a sharp decrease in the stock of
domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP. In the data for developing economies,
domestic credit to private sector ranges from 21% (UMIC) to 7.5% (LIC) relative to the US,
whereas the model counterpart goes from 31% to 4%. The model moment includes only the
stock of formal credit because the data contains loans from formal entities, and to our knowledge
there is no accurate measure of the stock of informal credit across countries. It is important
to note that data on private domestic credit includes not only business loans but also personal
loans, so these values should be taken as an approximation of the observed relationship between
ﬁrms credit and country income.
Diﬀerences in measured TFP are the result of capital being ineﬃciently distributed in the
economy. One of the main channels aﬀecting capital reallocation is the process of entry into
and exit out of the formal sector. We observe that as frictions increase, the exit rate (and the
entry rate, by construction) decreases. For example, the exit rate in the US is about 180% of
that of LMIC as observed in the data. This implies that even though the entry threshold to the
formal sector is higher for Low Income Countries and only the most productive ﬁrms in those
countries operate the large scale technology, ﬁrms stay in business for much longer, preventing
the natural process of churning of unproductive ﬁrms. Also, the model generates a relative
business density that is in line with the observed one (measured as the number of registered
businesses as a percentage of the active population). The business density drops to 1% of the
23US’s for the Low Income Countries. High frictions generate low density, which generates low
competitive pressures in the labor markets, generating low turnover in the formal sector (as
observed by the low entry rate in developing economies), and lower average productivity.
6.1 TFP diﬀerences and Misallocation
In this section, we provide diﬀerent measures of misallocation and study how they vary across
income groups. We start by showing a simple (but informative) picture with the output weighted
productivity across countries. Then, we explore two measures that address the level of resource
misallocation. First, we analyze a decomposition of productivity originally proposed by Olley
and Pakes (1996). Second, we investigate the dispersion of marginal product of capital, a
measure recently proposed in an inﬂuential paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2007). We ﬁnd that
allocative eﬃciency and the share of output produced by small scale ﬁrms in the informal sector
play a crucial role in explaining TFP diﬀerences.
















































Figure 3: Distribution of Output over Productivity across Income Groups
In Figure 3, we observe how output is distributed over ﬁrms’ productivity z. The increase
24in the entry cost κ raises the entry threshold to the formal sector15, generating a reallocation
towards more productive ﬁrms in that sector. However, as this cost rises the share of production
in the informal sector (less productive ﬁrms) also increases. We observe that the latter eﬀect
dominates, that is when distortions are higher the share of output produced by low productivity
ﬁrms increases. For example, ﬁrms with productivity less than or equal to 1.5 (z ≤ 1.5) account
for about 10% of output in the US, 25% in HIC, 55% in UMIC and around 90% in LMIC and
LIC.
It is crucial to provide a measure that captures how eﬃciently resources are allocated in
the economy. To address this issue we use a decomposition of weighted average plant-level




ziωidi = Ω s + (1 − Ω)[z + cov(zi,ωi)]
where b z is the average of plant level productivity weighted by output share, Ω is the informal
share of output, ωi are the output shares of each establishment in the formal sector, and z
is the un-weighted mean productivity in the formal sector. Therefore, the output weighted
productivity can be decomposed in three terms. First is the eﬀect of informal activity given by
Ω, and then the formal weighted productivity which can be decomposed into the un-weighted
average of ﬁrm-level productivity plus a covariance between output share and productivity . The
covariance captures allocative eﬃciency within the formal sector because it reﬂects the extent to
which ﬁrms with higher than average productivity have a greater market share. Table 7 displays
the values of this decomposition across income groups.
We observe that the value of output-weighted productivity correlates with our value of
measured TFP. As distortions increase, the value of b z decreases. This eﬀect is generated by
massive shifts to the informal economy, which goes from 7% in the US to 94% in the median Low
Income Country. However, the output-weighted productivity of the formal sector increases in the
poorer countries (the sum of z and cov(zi,ωi)). This is the direct result of higher productivity
15The productivity entry threshold to the formal sector goes from 2.88 standard deviations from the mean of
the l productivity process in the US to 3.24, 3.61, 4.33 and 4.33 in the HIC, UMIC, LMIC and LIC respectively
25entry thresholds to the formal sector together with lower wages in the poorer countries. The
threshold productivity level to enter the formal sector increases by almost 40% when we compare
the US to the LMIC or LIC and the wage rate decreases by 28 %. This endogenous diﬀerence in
the distribution of productivity in the formal sector across countries makes comparisons diﬃcult.
At ﬁrst glance it would look as if the formal sectors in the poorer countries are more eﬃcient
in assigning resources since the covariance between productivity and output share increases.
However, as we show in the next paragraph, formal sectors become less eﬃcient in assigning
resources across productivity levels as frictions increase.
Table 7: Firm Productivity Decomposition
Group b z Ω z cov(zi,ωi)
US 2.69 0.07 2.22 0.60
HIC 2.37 0.25 2.14 0.73
UMIC 1.56 0.65 2.17 0.81
LMIC 1.03 0.90 2.23 1.15
LIC 0.91 0.94 2.21 1.10
Understanding how capital is allocated across establishments in the formal sector is central
to the analysis, because all measured institutional diﬀerences across countries relate to ﬁrms
in this sector. In their inﬂuential paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) measure the dispersion of
marginal product of capital for registered manufacturing establishments in the US, China and
India. They observe that the standard deviation of log of marginal product of capital is greater
in India and China that in the US and conclude that TFP would increase between 30% and
60% if the dispersion was to adjust to US levels.16 This paper generates comparable dispersion
in the marginal product of capital to that documented by Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
Table 8 shows that the variance of the marginal product of capital in the LMIC and LIC is
23% and 29% higher than in the US. In the case of China and India (countries that are close
to our LMIC and LIC respectively), Hsieh and Klenow ﬁnd that the dispersion of marginal
16Note that more dispersion in the marginal product of capital reﬂects a lower degree of allocative eﬃciency
since a planner would distribute capital to equalize it across ﬁrms.
26product of capital is 13% and 46% higher than in the US. In our case it is the country speciﬁc
institutions that generate endogenously this dispersion and point towards ineﬃciencies in the
allocation of capital and labor even within formal sector.17
Table 8: Dispersion of Marginal Product of Capital - Formal sector
US HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
var(ln(MPK)) 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.31
Still in the formal sector, the allocation of capital and labor across establishments with
heterogeneous productivity can be analyzed against a frictionless benchmark economy with
commitment. In a frictionless world with commitment, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies







γ − w(1 + τw)n) − (r + δ)k
￿
The solution to this problem implies that the capital-labor ratio for each country is constant
across ﬁrms and depends only on factor prices, i.e independent of productivity. More speciﬁcally,
  (k/n) =
α
γ
w(1 − τ)(1 + τw)
(r + δ)
.
Using a notion of eﬃciency that is similar to the one we use to study productivity, we deﬁne a
measure of the capital to worker ratio in the formal sector as follows:
  (k/n) = (k/n) + cov((k/n)i,ωi)
This measure captures diﬀerences in prices, and as before can be decomposed in a “mean”
eﬀect and “variation” eﬀect. An eﬃcient allocation will imply a covariance equal to zero. Table
17To keep the consistency with other tables in the paper, we reported the dispersion of marginal product of
capital across income groups. However, we also conducted the exercise for the China and India speciﬁc measured
frictions and ﬁnd values that are similar to those reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2007). More speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that var(ln(MPK)) for China equals 0.257 (7.4% higher than U.S.) and var(ln(MPK)) for India equals
0.3267 (36.13% higher than U.S.).
279 displays the values of   (k/n) and its decomposition for each income group.
Table 9: Capital Per Worker Decomposition in the Formal Sector
Group   (k/n) (k/n) cov((k/n)i,ωi)
\ (k/n)
^ (k/n)
US 2.29 2.63 -0.33 0.83
HIC 2.25 2.82 -0.57 0.83
UMIC 1.96 2.70 -0.73 0.75
LMIC 1.55 2.52 -0.96 0.66
LIC 1.37 2.25 -0.88 0.64
We observe that the output-weighted capital to labor ratio decreases in the formal sector
as we move from the US to less developed economies. Part of this decrease is related to the
decreases in after-tax wages across countries that aﬀect the eﬃcient ratio,   (k/n), as well as the
model average, (k/n). But as the last column of Table 9 shows, the departure from optimal
levels increases as we move towards lower income countries. This suggests the existence of higher
eﬀective average interest rates in the poorer countries completely generated by ﬁnancial frictions
heterogeneity. We also note that most of this decrease in   (k/n) comes from the covariance. Low
income countries display a larger covariance term (in absolute value), implying that large ﬁrms
substitute away from capital and towards labor more than small ﬁrms. This is the result of
diﬀerences in the endogenous ﬁrm speciﬁc schedule of loan prices.
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) emphasized that heterogeneity in prices faced by establish-
ments can lead to sizeable decreases in TFP and output per worker. Our model generates these
diﬀerences endogenously.
As the wage rate decreases and credit terms adjust to incorporate changes in default prob-
abilities. These diﬀerences are reﬂected in the debt to capital ratios, average employment, and
total capital stock by sector. Figure 4 displays loan prices q
f
l (k,b′,z) for the US and LMIC. On
the x-axis we have future debt b′, on the y-axis we have future capital k′ and a darker color
implies a lower price (higher interest rate). We note that ﬁrms in the formal sector in the US face
lower interest rates (higher q) for most combinations of future capital and debt. This implies
28tighter borrowing limits for ﬁrms in less developed countries.







US Equilibrium Price q



























LMIC Equilibrium Price q




























Figure 4: Diﬀerences In Financial Structure (US vs LMIC)
Changes in prices directly impact the optimal combination of debt and capital (especially in
the formal sector). Figure 5 shows the distribution of ﬁrms over the debt to capital ratio (b/k)
for each income group in the formal sector. As we move from the US to countries with lower
income, we observe that this distribution shifts towards small values. Two eﬀects are present
here. First, as ﬁrms face higher interest rates, they are able to borrow much less. For example,
we observe that in LMIC, compared to the US, the number of ﬁrms at b/k = 0 increases by 46%
(57% vs 39% respectively). Second, since the price function is much steeper for countries with
more frictions, ﬁrms over-accumulate capital in order to avoid reaching a constrained region,
i.e. where they face a high price for debt. Due to decreasing returns, ﬁrms that are bigger than
optimal reduce eﬃciency in the economy.




































Figure 5: Distribution of Debt to Capital Ratio (Formal Sector) across Income Groups
6.2 Eﬀects of each friction
In order to understand the individual eﬀects of each institution (entry costs, tax structure and
bankruptcy eﬃciency), we change them one by one and calculate the eﬀects of these individual
changes on the aggregates generated by the model. We measure the impact on US moments to
one by one changes in institutions to LMIC values. LMIC parameter values provide a natural
benchmark for understanding the results for various reasons. While keeping the parameters
within the observed range, they are noticeably diﬀerent from those of the US (our calibrated
economy). Furthermore, the model has its maximum explanatory power in terms of TFP for
the case of the LMIC country.
We ﬁnd that each friction aﬀects aggregate moments through diﬀerent channels. The entry
costs aﬀect total factor productivity by generating large shifts to the informal sector, while
producing small changes to the allocative eﬃciency of the formal sector. On the other hand,
the bankruptcy eﬃciency parameters aﬀect total factor productivity by shifting production to
the informal sector but also by disrupting the eﬃciency by which the formal sector allocates
resources. Taxes seem to be of no quantitative importance in explaining total factor productivity
30diﬀerences. In summary, we ﬁnd that when we move from US parameters to LMIC parameters,
the entry costs are responsible for roughly 2/3 of the gap in total factor productivity generated
by the model and the bankruptcy eﬃciency parameters are responsible for 1/3 of that gap.
Table 10: Eﬀect of Each Friction
US κLMIC {λ,φ}LMIC {τ,cτ,τw}LMIC LMIC
TFP 1 0.818 0.913 0.986 0.724
Informal labor force (%) 7.8 54.2 30.3 9.35 92.3
Output per eﬀ. Worker 1 0.734 0.844 1.011 0.63
var(ln(MPK)) 0.24 0.257 0.281 0.244 0.3
Note: TFP and Output per eﬀective worker are reported relative to the US value. Model TFP is calculated
as TFP ≡ Y
K e α where e α = 1/3 is taken from Hall and Jones (1999). See Table 4 for speciﬁc parameters.
Entry cost: The second column of table 10 reports the eﬀects of only changing the entry
costs to the formal sector from US to LMIC levels. Changes in the entry cost directly aﬀects the
productivity threshold that makes ﬁrms indiﬀerent between the formal and informal sector. This
change and the general equilibrium forces that aﬀect the prices that ﬁrms face produce a large
shifts to the informal sector and a relatively small eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the formal sector in
allocating resources. In particular, the share of the informal labor force changes from 7.8% to
54.2% and the variance of the marginal product of capital only increases by 5.8%. These eﬀects
are responsible for the 18% and 27% decreases in TFP and output per worker respectively.
Bankruptcy eﬃciency: The third column of table 10 reports the eﬀects of only changing the
bankruptcy eﬃciency parameters in the formal sector from US to LMIC levels. We change both
the recovery rate λ and the cost of bankruptcy proceedings φ. In this case, TFP drops 8.3%
and output per worker drops 15.6%. These eﬀects are due to an increase in informal activity
(informal labor force increases to 30.3%) but also in an ineﬃcient resource allocation within
the formal sector. The variance of the log of the marginal product of capital increases 15.6%
(almost triple the eﬀect when compared to the eﬀects of entry costs). This is responsible for
almost 70% of the gap in terms of marginal product of capital in the formal sector between the
US and the LMIC.
31Tax structure: The fourth column of table 10 reports the eﬀects of only changing the tax
structure parameters in the formal sector from US to LMIC levels (we change τ, cτ and τw
jointly). Although there are big changes in the parameters (26% decrease in the proﬁt tax rate
and 55% increase in the payroll tax rate the cost of tax compliance) the results in terms of total
factor productivity are negligible. Informal activity increases mildly from 7.8% to 9.35% but
output, and productivity remain almost unchanged. In the formal sector the dispersion of the
marginal product of capital is also unaﬀected by the changes in the tax structure.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a theory of total factor productivity based on measured capital market
imperfections and costs of creating and operating formal sector ﬁrms. We developed a general
equilibrium ﬁrm dynamics model with imperfect credit markets and endogenous formal and
informal sectors. Entering and operating in the formal sector is costly, but allows ﬁrms to
produce at a larger scale, while providing ﬁrms access to credit markets with better commitment
(given by observed recovery rates and associated costs).
The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of
formality are characterized by low allocative eﬃciency and a large share output produced by low
productivity ﬁrms in the informal sector. We show that, even when the technology available is
the same across income groups, production moves towards less productive ﬁrms as endogenous
diﬀerences in prices arise across income groups as the result of an increase in distortions
We ﬁnd that this mechanism is quantitatively important. When frictions are parameterized
using the World Bank Doing Business database, the model explains up to 60% of total factor
productivity diﬀerences between the US and developing economies. Consistent with the data,
we ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between income per-worker and the size of the informal
sector. We also isolate the eﬀects of each friction, ﬁnding that high entry costs aﬀect total factor
productivity through shifts to informality while bankruptcy eﬃciency impacts both, informal
activity and formal eﬃciency in assigning resources across ﬁrms.
32One of the main diﬀerences with previous papers in the literature is that we discipline the
changes in parameters with the Doing Business Data Set. In particular, diﬀerences across
countries are derived from their measure of recovery rates, cost of bankruptcy, tax structure and
formal entry costs. We also restrict the ex-ante heterogeneity to be identical across countries,
so diﬀerences in the ex-post distribution of ﬁrms are completely endogenous.
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